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Executive summary
The deep involvement of a number of euro-area banking groups in central and south-
eastern Europe has benefi tted the host countries and has strengthened the resilience of 
those banking groups. But this integration has become less close because of post-fi nancial 
crisis national rules that require banks to hold more capital at home, or other ring-fencing 
measures. Th ere is a risk integration might be undermined further by bank resolution 
planning, which is now gathering pace. 
Regulators and banks will need to decide between two distinct models for crisis 
resolution, and this choice will redefi ne banking networks. Most effi  cient in terms of 
preserving capital and the close integration of subsidiary operations would be if the Single 
Resolution Board – the banking union’s central resolution authority – takes the lead for the 
entire banking group. However, this will require parent banks to hold the subordinated debts 
of their subsidiaries. Persistent barriers to intra-group capital mobility – or the option for 
home or host authorities to impose such restrictions – will ultimately render such schemes 
unworkable. 
The second model would involve independent local intervention schemes, which 
European Union countries outside the banking union are likely to call for. Th is will require 
building capacity in local debt markets, and clarifying creditor hierarchies. Exposure to 
banking risks will ultimately need to be borne by host-country investors. Bail-in capital issued 
by subsidiaries to their parents cannot be a substitute because it would expose the home 
country to fi nancial contagion from the host.
To sustain cross-border linkages, banking groups and their supervisors will need 
to make bank recovery plans more credible, and to strengthen cooperation in resolution 
colleges (platforms that bring together all relevant parties in resolution planning and 
execution). Within the banking union there is no justifi cation for the various ring-fencing 
measures that have impeded the fl ow of capital and liquidity within banking groups.
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1 Introduction
Th e adoption of a bank-resolution regime has been a key step in the European Union’s quest 
to end taxpayer-funded bail outs and to quash the presumption that some fi nancial institu-
tions are too big to fail. Since 2015, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has quickly established 
itself as the banking union’s central resolution authority and has set per-bank targets for 
additional funding that could be subject to bail-in. 
Under the 2019 revision to the EU Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD), and 
the regulation governing the SRB, these targets for bail-in capital have been more accurately 
calibrated1. Requirements for the largest euro-area banking groups now closely resemble 
those for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), which began resolution planning 
already in 2014 under the guidance of the Financial Stability Board (Bolton and Oehmke, 
2018) 2. Crucially, the new EU requirements for bail-in capital now also apply to the subsidi-
aries of cross-border banking groups. Since late 2019, the SRB has also begun to clarify which 
operational and legal obstacles to a possible resolution will need to be addressed by banks 
(SRB, 2019). Th is could usher in a major transformation for banking groups that have so far 
run integrated cross-border operations.
However, the bank-led plans for recovery from a crisis and the SRB’s plans for resolution 
of institutions that have failed, re-open questions of how the international subsidiaries of 
euro-area banking groups would fare in a banking crisis in either the parent’s home or a host 
country. 
Nowhere is cross-border resolution planning more important than in central and 
south-eastern Europe3. Th e subsidiaries of euro-area banks in this region are typically system-
ically important within their respective host countries, though supervision and crisis planning 
will depend on close cooperation with the authorities in the parents’ home jurisdiction. Many 
vestiges of post-crisis ring-fencing persist in banking markets of both home and host coun-
tries, and continue to undermine this cooperation.
Planning for the resolution of a large euro-area cross-border banking group involves 
preparing for a worst-case scenario that might never come to pass, but must nevertheless 
be realistic. Th is Policy Contribution reviews the current state of fi nancial engagement by 
euro area-based banking groups in the central and eastern Europe region (section 2). It then 
sets out in section 3 the two alternative models for bank resolution. Section 4 then proposes 
priorities for three groups of countries: host countries within the banking union, EU states 
outside the banking union, and non-EU countries. Each faces distinct challenges in resolution 
planning and engagement with the SRB. Th e concluding section 5 sets out options for how 
this cooperation can be strengthened by banks and the SRB itself.
1 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:150:TOC. While the provisions in the capital 
regulation (CRR2) apply from the date of publication in June 2019, provisions in the directives (CRD5 and BRRD2) 
apply once transposed into national law by end-2020.
2 Th e G-SIBs that are subject to these earlier requirements for resolvability and that are based in the euro area are: 
Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, ING Bank, Santander, Société Générale and UniCredit Group. 
3 In this Policy Contribution, ‘central and south-east Europe’ refers to 11 countries that joined the EU between 2004 
and 2011: the three Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria 
and Romania. Note the International Monetary Fund uses a wider defi nition of the central, eastern and south-east 
Europe country grouping.
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2 Euro-area banking groups in central and 
south-eastern Europe
Up until the crisis of 2008-09, the deep fi nancial integration fostered by the subsidiary net-
works of European cross-border banks in the central and south-east Europe region served the 
fi rst phase of economic transition well. Th e presence of foreign-owned banks in the region’s 
banking markets is more marked than in any other emerging-market region. Empirical evi-
dence overwhelmingly points to benefi ts in terms of fi nancial stability and overall growth4. 
However, such integration has also led to a number of vulnerabilities, for instance in the form 
of excessive lending in foreign currencies or to property sectors.  
In the aftermath of the crisis, a sharp and protracted deleveraging of bank exposures set 
in between 2008 and 2016 (Figure 1). Th e reduction in cross-border bank funding in central 
and south-eastern European countries was particularly sharp compared to other emerging 
markets, though their fi nancial systems were quickly stabilised by a number of International 
Monetary Fund programmes, such as in Latvia and Hungary. Th e Vienna Initiative, an essen-
tially ad-hoc public-private forum, provided coordination between network banks, interna-
tional institutions and home and host authorities. Th is eff ort succeeded in limiting liquidity 
outfl ows, which stabilised by about 2015, and limited imposition of ring-fencing strategies by 
host countries.
Figure 1: External positions of foreign banks towards EU countries in central and 
eastern Europe, % of GDP
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics (2019Q1). Notes: Amounts outstanding/stocks of total claims on all instruments. Average of 6 
countries refers to: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania. Average is GDP weighted.
Since the fi nancial crisis, a number of euro-area banking groups have withdrawn from the 
central and south-east Europe region, refl ecting consolidation in their home markets. Foreign 
acquisitions of banks in the region have become rare. On the contrary, banking networks orig-
inating within the region have grown, most notably the Hungarian bank OTP. Nevertheless, 
the market shares of foreign-owned banks remain near their peak in south-eastern Europe 
(at 78 percent), though they have fallen by about 15 percentage points over the past ten years 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (Figure 2). Overall, foreign ownership 
stakes have narrowed (and those of local state-owned banks expanded), though foreign net-
works remain largely intact.
4  See for instance EBRD (2009), which documented the growth eff ects of capital infl ows. 
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Figure 2: Market shares of foreign- and state-owned banks in central and 
south-eastern European countries (% of total assets)
Source: Raiﬀ eisen Research (July 2009). Notes: central Europe = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia; southeast Europe = Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Romania, Serbia.
A signifi cant number of banking groups based in the euro area, under ultimate European 
Central Bank supervision, continue to operate extensive subsidiary networks in central and 
south-east Europe. Banking groups from Austria, Italy and France are deeply engaged in 
markets that have turned out to be consistently profi table and which, since the fi nancial crisis, 
have generated steady asset growth in excess of their euro-area home markets. Subsidiaries 
are typically signifi cant within host markets, and are often also signifi cant individually within 
the respective banking groups (Table 1 lists the largest groups with their respective host coun-
try market shares and the signifi cance of individual subsidiaries in total group assets)5. 
Home-host cooperation in supervision and resolution planning will remain particularly 
complex outside the banking union, given two broad trends over recent years: 
• First, funding models that previously relied on wholesale markets and parent-bank 
liquidity lines have become less risky because of a much greater reliance on local depos-
its, and in some countries on local debt markets (Figure 3 documents this increase in 
deposit-to-loan ratios). By funding themselves largely through local deposits, subsidiaries 
have become more decentralised and potentially amenable to local resolution schemes. 
Separation from the parent can now be foreseen, at least in fi nancial terms. 
• Second, euro-area authorities must confront a much greater scepticism on the part of 
local regulators about the fi nancial-stability implications of foreign-bank presence. Th is 
has been evident in preferential treatment for local banking champions, and in some 
instances through explicit goals of increasing domestic ownership in the sector.
EU banks' withdrawal from international exposures following the fi nancial crisis appears 
to have been much sharper than that of cross-border banks from other regions, such as Japan 
or the United States (McCauley et al, 2017).
Despite the strengthening of bank balance sheets, fi nancial integration in the EU has not markedly 
recovered since the crisis. ECB assessments show that a composite indicator of fi nancial integration 
within the euro area based on price measures has recovered, though it remains below pre-crisis levels. 
An indicator based on the extent of cross-border exposures has continued to decline (European 
Commission, 2019). Figure 4 shows the external claims of euro-area banks on six central European 
countries and on other countries in the currency area, and shows that these have been closely aligned.
5 Based on RBI (2019), the dominant banking groups in central Europe are Erste Bank of Austria, KBC, Santander, 
Unicredit, SocGen, RBI, Commerzbank, ING, BNP, Intesa and Millennium Bank. In addition, Slovenian bank NLB 
and Greece’s Eurobank operate in the south-east Europe region. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Foreign owned, central Europe
(left scale)
Foreign owned, south-east Europe
(left scale)
State owned, central Europe
(right scale)
State owned, south-east Europe
(right scale)
5 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚14 | November 2019
Table 1a: Share of euro-area banks’ subsidiaries in host country total banking assets (%), 2017
Erste Intesa KBC Nordea Raiff eisen Société 
Générale
UniCredit Euro-area 
banks*
N
on
-e
u
ro
 a
re
a 
E
U Bulgaria 8.2% 8.1% 7.8% 22.7% 62.9%
Croatia 15.0% 23.7% 7.8% 28.9% 75.8%
Czech Rep. 11.1% 11.6% 5.4% 8.6% 8.6% 85.8%
Hungary 2.4% 5.1% 9.1% 6.6% 8.3% 38.5%
Poland 3.3% 0.9% 52.7%
Romania 9.5% 1.1% 9.4% 14.0% 11.2% 65.0%
E
u
ro
-a
re
a
Estonia    14.2%    14.2%
Latvia 17.2% 18.1%
Lithuania 27.1% 27.1%
Slovakia 23.7% 21.7% 13.4% 18.1% 7.3% 89.3%
Slovenia 6.8% 9.0% 7.8% 37.5%
N
on
-E
U
Albania 12.1% 16.9% 5.5% 43.8%
N. Macedonia 8.3% 52.5%
Montenegro 14.1% 13.9% 41.3%
Serbia 4.6% 15.4% 7.3% 8.0% 10.1% 61.0%
Notes: Table shows all euro-area banks present in at least three central and south-eastern European countries. Green cells = 0-5%. Yellow cells = 5-10%. Pink cells = >10%. Data is missing 
for Erste North Macedonia and Intesa Czech Republic; market share in these countries might be underestimated as a result. Unicredit Slovakia ﬁ gures captured under the Czech Republic 
and decoupled based on World Bank ﬁ gures. * Corresponds to the combined market share of euro-area banks in each of the host countries, based on geographical location of the ultimate 
parent bank (as deﬁ ned by the SNL Financial database).
Table 1b : Share of euro-area banks’ subsidiaries in group assets (%), 2017
Non-euro area Euro area Total
Bank
Home 
country
Resolution 
strategy
BG HR CZ HU PO RO EE LV LT SK SI
Banco 
Santander
ES MPE - - - - 2.5 - - - - - - 2.5
BNP Paribas FR unclear - - - - 1.5 - - - - - - 1.5
Crédit Agricole FR SPE - - - - 0.3 0.0 - - - - - 0.3
Deutsche Bank DE SPE - - - - 0.6 - - - - - - 0.6
ING NL SPE - - 1.0 - 3.6 - - - - - - 4.6
Société 
Générale
FR SPE 0.3 - 3.3 - 0.3 0.9 - - - - 0.2 5.0
UniCredit IT SPE 1.2 2.0 2.5 1.1 - 1.1 - - - 0.6 0.3 8.9
Millenium BCP PT unclear - - - - 23.7 - - - - - - 23.7
Commerzbank DE unclear - - - 0.2 7.6 - - - - - - 7.8
Erste AT MPE - 4.0 24.9 3.5 - 7.2 - - - 7.4 - 47.0
Intesa IT SPE - 1.8 - 0.7 - 0.1 - - - 1.9 0.3 4.8
KBC BE SPE 1.5 - 19.6 3.3 - - - - - 3.2     - 27.6
Nordea FI SPE - - - - - - 14.0 0.8 1.2 - - 16.0
Raiff eisen AT MPE 2.7 3.4 9.9 5.2 - 5.8 - - - 9.3 - 36.3
Source for both tables: Bruegel based on SNL Financial, Fontan et al (2019) and banks’ annual reports and investor presentations. Notes: Data is missing for Intesa Czech Republic; 
Unicredit Slovakia ﬁ gures captured under the Czech Republic and decoupled based on World Bank ﬁ gures.
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Figure 3: Deposit-to-loan ratios in central and south-eastern EU countries
Source:  IMF Financial Soundness Indicators ('Customer deposits to total (non-interbank) lending'). Notes: data for Hungary is missing. 
Data complete from 2008. Average of ﬁ ve countries covers Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania.
Figure 4: Loans by euro-area banks by residence of the counter-party (% of GDP)
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics (2019Q1). Notes: External position of all euro-area BIS-reporting banks by residence of counter-
party. Amounts outstanding/stocks of total cross-border claims on all instruments. Countries included in the average are Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Averages are weighted according to GDP.
An assessment of whether central and south-eastern European fi nancial markets have 
become more or less integrated with the rest of the euro area would yield diff erent answers 
depending on which of the three common empirical measures is used: fi rst, cross-border 
capital fl ows of course remain unimpeded by explicit restrictions within the single market 
(Bush, 2015); second, cross-border holdings of fi nancial securities (in particular in several 
large local sovereign debt markets) have kept price trends in key asset classes closely aligned; 
a third measure of discriminatory treatment of local market participants (based on Baele, 
2004) yields a more nuanced outcome.
Th e European fi nancial crisis off ered ample evidence of failures in the coordination of 
crisis-management measures between home and host countries and of resolution strategies 
focused on individual countries at the expense of the group. Th is resulted in ring-fencing of 
capital and liquidity by both home and host countries, which damaged the resilience of bank-
ing groups and resulted in additional risks for sovereign fi nances within the parent banks’ 
home jurisdictions.
Even under the revamped EU banking rules, numerous obstacles still impede the free fl ow 
of capital, liquidity and information within cross-border banks in the single market (EBA, 
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2018). Th e ECB has argued for some time that the common prudential standards within the 
banking union justify waiving capital and liquidity requirements that are applied by individ-
ual jurisdictions. For instance, even the funding of a subsidiary by its parent within the euro 
area might still be subject to large exposure limits, just like those applied to unrelated parties. 
Th ese measures are consistent with EU legislation, such as the Capital Requirements Direc-
tive (2013/36/EU), but often originate with government agencies, rather than the supervisor, 
or are classed as macro-prudential, rather than bank-specifi c measures (Table 2).
Th e EU countries in central and south-east Europe appear to be particularly active users of 
limits (Kudrna and Puntscher Riekman, 2017). In central and south-eastern European coun-
tries, more stringent treatment is introduced more quickly, options to demand additional cap-
ital buff ers are utilised fully, and exemptions on the holding of liquidity within foreign-owned 
subsidiaries are accepted more rarely than elsewhere in the EU. A common eff ect has been to 
segment capital and liquidity within banking groups.
Th ere is a clear risk that the existing segmentation of banking markets that arises from the 
regulatory treatment of foreign subsidiaries will now be accentuated by the way resolution 
planning is done and by how the requirements are set for associated bail-in funds. 
Table 2: Overview of national options and discretions (‘NODs’)
Legal basis
NODs can be enshrined in the Capital Directive, rather than the 
harmonised regulation, and hence give rise to diff ering national 
implementation
Responsible 
body
NODs may be implemented by member states, rather than the 
competent authority, are outside Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
jurisdiction
Time horizon Th e envisaged timeline for phasing out NODs diff ers between countries
Types of 
measure
Micro-prudential NODs largely concern the quality of bank capital 
and are under the purview of the single regulator (and hence the SSM 
regulation), whereas macro-prudential measures relate to the level of 
capital to counter systemic risk
Scope of 
measures
Exemptions could be granted across the board or only on an individual 
basis through waivers and derogations.
Source: European Parliament. 
3 Resolution plans with single and multiple 
points of entry 
To understand the emerging tensions between home and host countries in Europe it is im-
portant to recap the distinction between the two principal models of resolution: this could be 
done via a ‘single point of entry’ (SPE) or through ‘multiple points of entry’ (MPE), depend-
ing on whether one or several resolution schemes address all or separate parts of a failed 
banking group. Th ese were the two stylised scenarios set out in the original guidance from the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2013). At the time, this represented an important innovation 
in cross-border banking policy (Tucker, 2013). With the EU’s June 2019 banking package, this 
treatment of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has been replicated in the revised 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD2) and the Regulation on the Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism. 
In the SPE model, a single resolution scheme applies to the entire group under the 
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direction of the home-country authority6. Subsidiaries in host countries issue bail-in capital 
(equity and sub-ordinated bonds) to a parent or holding company. Th is is loss-absorbing 
capital (in EU terminology, the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 
or MREL) that is internal to the group and no other investors hold these liabilities7. Only 
the holding company would issue MREL-type sub-ordinated bonds into the market under 
home-country law, and holding-company MREL is at least as large as the sum of all internal 
MREL issued to it by all subsidiaries. 
Once losses occur within any subsidiary, the parent will need to inject capital to meet 
host-country regulation for capital coverage, or if necessary, convert internal MREL into 
equity. Losses are passed up and capital is passed down. 
However, if the subsidiary is large enough, its losses might put at risk the entire hold-
ing company (in EU terms, render it failing or likely to fail). As the holding company enters 
resolution, the home authority implements its global resolution plan, and there is no need for 
diff erent national insolvency proceedings. All assets are valued but resolution tools are imple-
mented at the holding-company level only (the resolution entity). Its equity is written off , 
subordinated debt issued by the holding company may be converted into equity, and other 
senior bonds might suff er the same fate. Th is allows the recapitalisation of the subsidiaries. 
A key feature of this model is that, at least initially, the ownership structure of the group 
remains intact. Underlying profi tability problems, including in the host countries, can be 
dealt with based on a group restructuring plan. As subsidiaries issued subordinated debt 
only to the holding company, only its investors are subject to a bail-in within the resolution 
scheme. Other host-country liabilities of the subsidiary will remain senior to those of the 
holding company. A key benefi t of SPE is that only one agency – in Europe, most likely the 
SRB – will be in charge. Th e solution is also effi  cient in preserving equity, which can be allo-
cated wherever needed within the group.
However, it is essential that all home and host-country authorities cooperate in this solu-
tion. For example, should a loss occur in a single subsidiary and deplete the capital at hold-
ing-company level, at fi rst internal bail-in capital (MREL) would be converted and possibly 
additional capital would be made available to the subsidiary. Should a host supervisor have 
doubts about the commitment of the parent to this process, it would be faced with a bank 
that is failing under local law. In anticipation of such an outcome, the host authority would be 
inclined to ring-fence capital, as would other jurisdictions where the group has a presence. In 
the absence of trust in a cooperative outcome, the single resolution scheme cannot be relied 
on and would be rendered unworkable through national ring-fencing strategies. 
Th e polar opposite of this scenario is the model of multiple resolution schemes (MPE) 
evolving in parallel. Here, the banking group is resolvable within the national boundaries of 
each of the jurisdictions in which it operates, with minimal need for coordination (resolution 
groups may also apply to several member states). Clearly this sets a high bar, not just for rais-
ing bail-in capital in each jurisdiction, but also for making the bank ‘resolvable’ in legal and 
operational terms. Following a resolution, investors in subordinated debt would be converted 
into a set of distinct national groups of new owners. Th e group would be essentially broken up 
along national lines. 
As shown by Faia and Weder di Mauro (2016), the SPE scheme in which all host countries 
cooperate is more effi  cient than the MPE regime, in terms of sustaining fi nancial integra-
tion and containing losses borne by bond holders following a resolution. However, national 
ring-fencing measures, or even the option to impose such restrictions, will undermine an 
SPE resolution scheme. In the context of poor home-host cooperation, the still patchy single 
6 Th e scheme could also apply to just a part of the banking group (the so-called ‘resolution group’).
7 MREL is the sum total of all capital support in resolution (for globally systemic banks the equivalent measure is 
total loss-absorbing capacity, TLAC). It is typically set a level roughly twice that of minimum capital requirements, 
so about 24 percent of risk-weighted assets. Where no capital buff ers exist, an institution might therefore be asked 
to raise subordinated debt in an amount similar to its equity base.
If a failing subsidiary 
is large enough, its 
losses might put at 
risk the entire holding 
company
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resolution schemes might well be inferior to both of the stylised regimes set out here. Of three 
competing objectives – fi nancial stability, cross-border banking and national crisis-resolution 
policies – only two can be attained simultaneously (Schoenmaker, 2017).
4 Priorities for three groups of countries 
Whether a bank opts for a single resolution scheme or one administered in multiple jurisdic-
tions depends on its business model and to what extent individual units would be separable 
in a resolution (and this initial choice would then need to be approved by the resolution col-
lege). SPE has been the preferred model for groups where wholesale banking dominates and 
where there are substantial exposures between diff erent parts of group, such as in investment 
banking. Conversely, the MPE model appeals in particular to retail banks with local deposit 
funding, which operate as separate businesses, albeit with shared central services and com-
mon risk-management standards. 
At the time of writing, resolution colleges have not fi nalised these decisions, which would 
in any case be revisited regularly (Table 1b lists the banks’ early choices as disclosed in inves-
tor disclosures). Th e two leading Spanish banking groups, BBVA and Santander, have opted 
for MPE, based on the long-standing decentralisation of their Latin American subsidiaries 
(BBVA, 2014). Austrian groups Erste and Raiff eisen International, each with extensive subsid-
iary networks in central Europe, similarly opted for this model. However, UniCredit Group, 
present in nine countries in central and south-east Europe, structures itself around a single 
point of entry.
Banking groups now need to become ‘resolvable’ in line with their chosen models. Th e 
need to choose between the two models has already resulted in wide-ranging changes to 
the legal, organisational and fi nancial structures of European banking groups. SPE banking 
groups have established holding companies that now issue subordinated bonds for the entire 
group. For groups under an MPE scheme, operational resolvability is clearly a key challenge. 
Groups have reorganised into regional and functional sub-groups, often with associated 
holding companies subject to individual SPE resolution schemes. Common services such as 
IT, treasury or marketing have been separated into entities that would not be aff ected by a 
resolution of the group. 
In practice, the choice between the two models may not be clear-cut and various hybrid 
solutions have been designed, for instance through regional holdings, or where a subsidiary 
in one host country manages bank branches in another. 
Th e SRB has regularly coordinated the resolution colleges. Th ere have been some public 
remarks pointing to tensions between home and host countries, though by time of writing 
only one mediation case had been taken to the European Banking Authority (EBA), by the 
National Bank of Romania in 20188. 
4.1 Resolution planning within the banking union 
In principle, within the banking union there is no longer a distinction between home and 
host countries. Th e SSM conducts supervision based on a ‘single rulebook’, in the process 
approving recovery plans for entire groups, and would take a decision that the group is ‘failing 
or likely to fail’ based on the consolidated balance sheet. A resolution plan is similarly drafted 
for groups as a whole, as within the euro area, most banking groups would typically choose 
the SPE approach with the parent as the single resolution entity. Th e SRB is required to take a 
8 Th e EBA’s decision is however heavily redacted: https://eba.europa.eu/eba-issues-fi rst-binding-mediation-deci-
sion-between-the-srb-and-the-nbr.
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balanced approach that respects the interests of all countries9. 
In practice, local authorities retain a signifi cant infl uence because they play a key role 
in shaping the resolution process. Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) on which the local 
subsidiary might need to rely heavily in a pre-crisis situation, remains at the sole discretion of 
the local government. 
Despite these centralised powers in supervision and resolution, the various national 
options and discretions set out in section 3 (Table 2) still also allow ring-fencing of intra-
group capital transfers within the banking union. In light of this still imperfect integration, the 
revised BRRD provides for internal MREL to be set at a level equivalent to what it would be 
if the subsidiary was an independent institution. Oddly, the comparable standard set by the 
Financial Stability Board for G-SIBs would recommend a range of between 75 and 90 percent 
of that level. Also, a euro-area host-country authority may still demand a recovery plan for the 
individual subsidiary, even if such a plan has already been approved for the group as a whole. 
Paring back such powers remains a challenge even under the banking package that has come 
into eff ect in 2019, and might require other safeguards for host countries (Council of the EU, 
2019). 
Th e fi ve euro-area countries in central Europe (the Baltic States, Slovakia and Slove-
nia) have been subject to integrated supervision and resolution planning for several years. 
Arguably, the options under the revised BRRD return some further powers to local resolution 
authorities. 
More credible standards in supervision through the SSM, and common resolution plan-
ning, including access to the Single Resolution Fund, should in principle make the banking 
union attractive for the remaining non-euro EU countries in the region (Hüttl and Schoen-
maker, 2016; Lehmann and Nyberg, 2014). Bulgaria and Croatia are at time of writing in the 
process of entering a ‘close cooperation’ with the ECB, and thus will come under the resolu-
tion powers of the SRB. Romania might take a similar step in the future. All three countries are 
hosts to euro-area bank subsidiaries that are systemic within their own markets. Th e subsidi-
aries in Romania are also systemic within three euro-area banking groups (Table 1).  
4.2 EU countries outside the banking union
Th ree key host countries with a signifi cant euro-area bank presence will likely remain outside 
the banking union for the foreseeable future: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Given 
their tendency towards more inward-looking industrial and banking policies, tensions with 
the euro-area institutions could easily emerge. 
Th e EU’s post-crisis regulatory framework, as embodied in the CRR/CRD legislation, has 
in many ways addressed past coordination failures. All EU host countries are members of 
group-level supervisory colleges, via which they are given access to information and partici-
pate in all decisions. Importantly, this includes the approval of each bank’s recovery plan (a 
strategy to pre-empt stress drafted by each bank). Asset sales or additional funding facilities 
could directly impact subsidiary operations. Th is coordination between the SSM and non-
euro area EU supervisors seems to have worked well, though some tensions have emerged 
over the supervision of large branches. On the whole, host-country rights have largely been 
respected10.
In relation to resolution planning, host-country authorities and the SRB decide on joint 
strategies in the resolution colleges, which meet less frequently than the supervisory colleges. 
Th is process is newer, and has been less transparent than the supervisory college process. 
For EU host countries outside the banking union, acceding to SPE schemes led by the SRB 
will require considerable trust that resolution and restructuring at parent level will leave sub-
sidiary operations intact. Even though no subordinated debt needs to be issued under an SPE 
9 Fontan et al (2019), and Art. 6 SRMR. 
10 Fontan et al (2019) informally surveyed EU host country supervisors, and still detected problems in information 
sharing, including coordination of on-site inspections.
In practice, local 
authorities retain a 
signifi cant infl uence 
in shaping the 
resolution process; 
emergency liquidity 
assistance remains at 
the sole discretion of 
the local government
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scheme, some subsidiaries are owned to a signifi cant degree by local investors. Poland, for 
instance, has had a long-standing policy of fostering equity issuance of foreign-bank subsidi-
aries on the local market. 
Host countries will be especially keen to ensure that the losses and recapitalisation needs 
of local subsidiaries in a single-point-of-entry scheme can be passed with legal certainty to 
the resolution entity in the euro area. Th e Financial Stability Board guidance (FSB, 2017) that 
covers the design of internal bail-in funds of G-SIBs is instructive in this regard: 
• Issuance should ideally be direct from the subsidiary to the parent;
• Internal MREL should be governed by host-country law, as this gives the host resolution 
authority the option to apply its own powers if the home authority (SRB) does not trigger 
conversion of MREL;
• Home authorities should not subject internal MREL to large exposure limits;
• Th ere should be consistent creditor hierarchies;
• Th e parent should cover internal MREL exposures fully with its own capital base (rather 
than discounting the exposure through risk-weights). 
A key question for any host country cooperating in SPE schemes will concern the use of 
the Single Resolution Fund, which is funded by euro-area banks, and the future backstop 
facility from the European Stability Mechanism, which is funded by euro-area taxpayers. It is 
easy to foresee tensions if resolution of the entire group would in part be needed because of 
problems with a substantial subsidiary outside the banking union.
Several banking groups have proposed the alternative strategy of multiple resolution 
points, or have been encouraged to adopt such schemes in the resolution colleges. Pressure 
by host countries to design local resolution schemes could be circumvented by switching to a 
structure of branches which would all be subject to a single home-country resolution scheme, 
and would benefi t from potential support from the Single Resolution Fund. Th ese branches 
would be guaranteed in, and operate out of, the euro-area home jurisdiction (as notably done 
by Nordea, which moved the group head offi  ce from Sweden to Finland). 
Accommodating resolution plans based on multiple points of entry, including a local 
scheme, confronts two further complications.
Th e fi rst is the lack of an investor base for locally-issued subordinated debt. Several central 
and south-eastern European countries have already argued that their domestic bond markets 
are too shallow to support issuance of bail-in capital that supports local resolution schemes. 
Figures from the ECB’s securities database (Table 3) make it clear that some capital markets, 
such those in as Croatia or Bulgaria, are indeed too small to allow sizable issuance. Local 
banks are primarily funded through deposits, and bank bond issuance is barely developed 
(S&P, 2017). 
Others, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, seem to have suffi  cient local 
capitalisation to sustain issuance, even though local banks might not be well prepared to 
launch issuance programmes and engage investors. Th is points to the general problem of a 
dearth of a local institutional investors, and uncertainty about how a creditor bail-in would 
proceed. 
Where the domestic market is a constraint, international fi nancial institutions, such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have already begun to invest 
in the MREL of local banks. In this way they assume part of the risk of local bank failures, and 
become exposed to a bail-in under a local resolution regime (somewhat undermining the 
policy objective of shifting this risk to private investors). Supranational investors can help 
develop host country regulations for creditor bail-in, build investor bases and provide a relia-
ble demand for an as-yet novel asset class. 
Th ere is an ongoing debate about whether parent banks should help overcome this 
constraint by funding the bail-in capital of their subsidiaries. Home countries argue that a 
host-country resolution scheme supported by internal MREL would expose the parent to con-
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tagion, which the home country has only limited powers to contain. Th is overlooks the fact 
that a host-country supervisor outside the euro area always has the ultimate power to declare 
a subsidiary as failing, and in doing so would trigger conversion of bail-in funds (whether or 
not these are internal).
Table 3: Local bond market capitalisation (% of GDP) by sector of the issuer
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105.5 4.2 19.3 75.3 55.7 40.7 16.1
thereof
Govt. bonds 68.8 3.9 18.3 26.1 51.6 31.7 16
Corporate bonds 9.6 0.3 0.9 2.3 0.5 3.9 0
Bank bonds 27.1 0 0.1 46.9 3.6 5.1 0.2
Source: ECB SEC. Notes: bonds deﬁ ned as non-share securities issued by general government (government bonds), non-ﬁ nancial corpo-
rations ESA 2010 classiﬁ cation (corporate bonds), and MFIs (bank bonds). Includes bonds issued in domestic currency only.
Th e second concern about MPE resolution plans is that the integrated structure of banking 
groups in the region might not be amenable to local resolution schemes. Unlike the group-
wide resolution plan in the SPE model, the resolution plan conceived by the host country in 
the MPE scheme in principle requires the operational and fi nancial separation of two or more 
resolution entities (eg made up of a subsidiary and the entities under it) within the overall 
banking group. Under the BRRD, it is within the host country’s powers to direct the resolution 
entity (subsidiary) to address the so-called ‘barriers to resolvability’. Th is might include fairly 
intrusive measures, such as organisational or structural changes, or restrictions on certain 
business lines (World Bank, 2016). 
Th e growing reliance on host-country funding, as depicted in Figure 3, suggests that 
central and south-eastern European subsidiaries would be well-prepared for separation from 
the parent, should the host authority require independent treasury functions. Other func-
tions shared within the group could be relatively easily replicated locally – for example IT or 
marketing – or can at least be outsourced, even though such an operational decentralisation 
of course entails further costs. 
Th is fi nancial and organisational separation of subsidiaries would undermine the very 
business case of the euro-area network banks that operate in the CEE region. Nevertheless, 
several banking groups have already adopted such a more decentralised structure, and 
indeed seem inclined to adopt an MPE strategy for their subsidiaries. 
4.3 Banking networks in the candidate countries and EU neighbourhood 
Th e presence of euro-area banks in the countries in the immediate EU neighbourhood is 
in many cases as deep as their presence within the EU states of central Europe. Immedi-
ate neighbourhood countries can be divided into two groups: the four candidate countries 
(Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia), and countries without an immediate 
membership prospect. All would be considered ‘third countries’ by home-country supervi-
sors, even though the alignment with EU fi nancial regulation is increasingly close. Candidate 
countries in particular have adopted laws on resolution very similar to the BRRD11. 
A potential risk is that in the absence of good coordination and information sharing, host 
countries might be tempted into local resolution schemes and ring-fencing solutions. In 
practice, the presence of euro-area banks in the western Balkan countries is suffi  ciently deep 
11 Th e three countries with EU Association Agreements (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) are also obliged to approxi-
mate their fi nancial regulations to those of the EU, including for newly adopted legislation. 
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so that host countries have allowed the SRB take a lead in designing group-wide resolution 
schemes12. All countries have secured a determination from the European Commission that 
their confi dentiality standards are equivalent to those in the EU and the SRB has signed coop-
eration agreements with its counterparts in Serbia and Albania. Nevertheless, much could be 
done to improve cooperation, in particular by involving host authorities in a wider range of 
supervisory processes, in particular in resolution colleges. 
5 Policies that foster cooperation 
Amidst solid economic growth rates, return on equity and capital coverage in the banking 
sectors of the central and south-eastern European EU members remain very strong. Unlike in 
the immediate aftermath of the crisis, there is little perception of fi nancial vulnerability, and 
a number of countries are seeking to strengthen domestic ownership of local banking sectors. 
Th e benefi ts that euro-area banks brought to the region remain valuable, in particular in 
the form of risk management skills and funding capacity in the context of shallow local debt 
markets. 
Despite the much more uniform EU regulatory framework and the strengthened balance 
sheets of euro-area banks, the memory of the fi nancial crisis that posed major fi scal risks to 
host governments is still alive. EU countries continue to use various instruments that impede 
the sharing of capital and liquidity within bank groups. 
Even within the banking union, capital and liquidity within banking groups is not fully 
fungible. Ring-fencing by home and host countries, and the policy of pre-positioning bail-in 
capital within the subsidiaries of banking groups subject to a single SRB-led resolution 
scheme, are the consequence of inadequate risk sharing within the currency union. Th e 
revised BRRD did little to overcome this fragmentation, and possibly accentuates it.
Th e SRB’s resolution planning, and its cooperation with authorities in the region, should 
aim to preserve the benefi ts of fi nancial integration. Th e SRB taking the lead in a single reso-
lution strategy is effi  cient in terms of preserving shared liquidity and capital, and the common 
functions of the banking group, though is demanding in terms of home-host cooperation: 
• Within the banking union there needs to be a clearer process to phase out ring-fencing of 
capital and liquidity as some limited risk-sharing takes hold. Barriers to intra-group cap-
ital mobility have no justifi cation in the ultimate steady state of fully-integrated national 
banking markets. During the transition to a fully-fl edged banking union, host countries 
might require certain safeguards. Setting requirements for bail-in capital funded by the 
parent could off er such reassurance. In a steady-state banking union with full risk sharing, 
such pre-positioning of bail-in capital would be no longer necessary. National insolvency 
regimes for banks should also be harmonised with this long-term aim in mind. 
• Close cooperation between the SRB and host countries outside the banking union will 
be essential. Th is should include early and full access to bank recovery plans and draft 
resolution plans in the colleges. SRB-led resolution plans for entire groups would need 
to reassure host countries that bail-in capital can be converted once deemed necessary 
by the local supervisor. Th is would entail use of the single resolution fund and the ESM 
backstop – in other words euro-area fi scal resources for banking sector risks outside the 
banking union.
At the same time, the SRB will need to be prepared that large EU host countries outside the 
12 A memorandum of understanding was signed by the European Banking Authority and six countries in south-east-
ern Europe in 2015 putting in place a process for such convergence. 
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banking union will implement independent resolution planning. 
• Local resolution plans in large host countries will need to be reconciled with the SRB-led 
schemes which might only cover part of a banking group but presume capital mobility 
across the entire group. Th e colleges where resolution plans are discussed will need to 
become more encompassing and transparent, also to pre-empt ad-hoc host-country 
ring-fencing measures. 
• For their part, banks need to become more transparent about how they are reorganising to 
become ‘resolvable’ along national or regional lines, as defi ned by their chosen resolu-
tion strategies. Th e SRB’s draft resolvability assessment standards published in October 
2019 will guide banks better in this area13. Banks could off er more credible scenarios for 
the potential fi nancial support between diff erent parts of the group. So far, banks seem to 
overestimate their capacities to strengthen capital and liquidity in a crisis (ECB, 2018). Th e 
so-called group fi nancial support agreements that would allow the up-streaming of capital 
and liquidity from the subsidiaries ahead of a crisis could be further developed14.
• Finally, there is a need to make local laws on creditor hierarchies and bail-in compliant 
with the BRRD. Bail-in capital issued between parts of a single group is in the nature of 
a ‘private placement’ though may ultimately be traded in public markets. Locally issued 
subordinated debt could be developed with the help of supranational investors. Inde-
pendent resolution schemes that concern only local subsidiaries ultimately need to be 
backed up by a local investor class that shelters host-country taxpayers from the risks of 
bank failure. 
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